

THE GROWTH OF THE COTTON SOLE ADMINISTRATION IN THE SURKHANDARYA REGION AND ITS SOCIO-ECONOMIC COMPLICATIONS

Otabek Nazarov

Teacher of Termiz State University

Annotation


The article analyzes information about the political-social company-"cotton case" that took place in the Uzbek SSR in the 80s of the 20th century. During the period of "reconstruction" in the entire former Soviet Union, the situation of agriculture, food, industrial sectors in the Surkhandarya region, the strengthening of the cotton monopoly and its socio-economic complications were analyzed with the help of researched scientific works and literature.

Keywords: "cotton work", raw materials, cotton, crisis, personnel, court, criminal liability, imprisonment, deprivation of liberty, acquittal.

In addition to plundering national treasures in the process of implementing the Soviet cotton policy, he also implemented the anti-ritual, values, and anti-ceremonial policies of local ethnic groups. This process took place in a unique way in the surkhandarya region.

Unemployment could be eliminated through the development of other agricultural sectors and industries in the region. But the cotton monopoly did not allow. The industry has developed extremely slowly[13]. Although Surkhandarya is a cone of cotton and other raw materials, nothing was done to produce ready-made products from it. Statistics show that in 1940, 48,000 pograms of gas were produced in the province and 80,000 in 1960, after which they stopped until the 1980s. Then, in 1982, only 7 thousand meters of gas were produced, 8,000 in 1983, 7,000 in 1984, and completely discontinued in 1985. No care was also shown regarding knitting products. The only sewing factory in the region is located in Thermal, and in 1985 it produced only 10,000 high-knitting products. This figure was 3988,000 in Bucharest, 3839,000 in Jezreel, 3022,000 in Samarkand, 25,000 in Khmer Rouge, and 652,000 in the province of Tashkent. Knitting was equal to Navoi in Surkhandarya region in terms of production and was only above Karakalpakstan (7 thousand).

Despite the work of the main place of provincial pillaging, the Union's best agronomists and selectors, it produced 1,427 tons of pillows in 1985 and produced a total of 1,366 pogram meters. The thread needed by him is also brought from the edge. However, in that year, 76231 meters of silk gas were produced in the province of Badakhshan, 55066 in Fargo, 11739 in Samarkand[14]. Such a situation could be observed in other areas of the industry.



Production of reinforced concrete structures in Surkhandarya is 300.1 thousand m³ (342.8 thousand in the region, 439 thousand in Kashgar, 350.5 thousand in Samarkand, 1389.6 thousand in Tashkent, 549.3 thousand m³ in Fergana); Brick production amounted to 100 million (169.3 million in Khmer Rouge, 262.3 million in Fargo, 430.6 million in the tashkent region, 136.1 million in the region, 176.1 million in Anchorage, and 128.4 million in Samarkand). Electricity production reached 9.9 million kWh in 1940 and 76.7 million kWh in 1960, compared with only 0.3 million kwh in 1985.

As a result of the policy of cotton farming carried out by the center, Uzbekistan, including the Surxon-Sherabad Valley, became the USSR's raw material base. Total irrigated land (along with those used for a short period of time) in Surxondary reached 285.6 thousand hectares in 1985. This figure was 1971 196,3 thousand hectares[15]. As a result of land degradation, 280.8 thousand acres [280.8 thousand ha] of land were subsistence farmed in 1985. Of these areas, 240.3 thousand hectares were occupied for the 1985 crop. Since then, 37.3,000 hectares of land have been allocated to the grain (16.3 thousand for spring and autumn wheat, 8.1 thousand for corn grain, 8.2 thousand for soybeans), 154.9 thousand in grain, and 42.4 thousand hectares for 5.4,000 cereals for potatoes, vegetables and vegetable crops.

Although productivity increased, the allocated land was not enough to provide food for the population[16]. On the contrary, the cultivation of wheat and soybeans decreased. The convening of most pastures into cotton-planted areas has led to a reduction in the number of livestock, a lack of satisfaction with the demand and needs of the population for meat, dairy and dairy products. In 1975, it was planned to receive 28,9 thousand tons of milk in the province, in practice it was 9,2 thousand tons. The Boysun district, the largest livestock center in the region, was able to fulfill its plan to hand over meat to the state only in the 1990s. Until then, it was not possible to complete the plan for 15 years. Milk, on the other hand, was performed 84 percent. But it was 115 tons more than in 1989. In 1990, only 2,000 tons of grain were cultivated throughout the region [29]. In the region, from 1986 to 1989, plans for the transfer of meat and milk in many farms were challenged.

For the above reasons, the surkhandarya region was unable to provide food for its inhabitants [17] and was forced to bring it from abroad. It was not until 1987-1989 that apples—Polish, butter—were imported from France, condensed milk and sugar were imported from Ukraine and Russia, meat was from Mongolia, flour and potatoes were imported from Russia, and canned products were imported from Hungary. Tropical and subtropical fruits such as quality chocolate products, such as mandarin, oranges, bananas, rarely came, and they were also sold by acquaintance[30]. The fact that people were in turn for bread and milk was a general view of the 1970s and 1980s. The economy of the Surxon-Sherabad Valley has retreated and "painful points" have emerged in all areas of society. The shortage of goods intensified in the region[18].



The Soviet state, focusing on increasing the volume and yield of cotton in Uzbekistan, tried to pick it up at a low value. To do this, by 1989, 1 kg [1 kg] of cotton harvested during the plowing season was paid 5 pounds [5 kg]. This was equal to the price of 1 glass of lemonade at that time. Until 1990, the Soviet Union paid 810 gallons [810 L] of cotton refined in mining factories[31]. According to economists, in 1985, the market price of 1 ton of tomatoes was 2,700 gallons [2,700 L]. During that time, 730.7 gallons [730.7 L] of tomatoes and 145.3 gallons [145.3 L] of grain were produced in our country, It cost 244.4 gallons [244.4 L] of potatoes, 131.9 gallons [131.9 L] of open-ended vegetables, 2,375 gallons [2,375 L] of cattle meat, 1,490 gallons [1,490 L] of sheep meat, 343.1 gallons [343.1 L] of milk, 116.8 gallons [116.8 L] of eggs, and 6644.6 gallons [6644.6 L] of wool. Setting a very low price for cotton, the Soviet Union did not give Uzbekistan \$14.6 billion (\$1 in 1985) in four years (1984-1988). Interestingly, until the revolution, Russian mermers paid 5 times more than the Soviets for a ton of cotton fiber, that is, 556 rubles in gold cylinders [19].

The looting policy of the Mustabid Soviet regime led to the level of living in Uzbekistan falling to the lowest in the Union. In the 1980's, when the average per capita income was distributed, the USSR amounted to 2,118 gallons [2,118 L] and 1,093 gallons [1,093 L] of income in the country. Below that was in Tajikistan. In the mid-1980's, 5 hours and 88 pieces of silver were used for one working day, In Tajikistan, there were 6 gallons [6 L] of 04 gallons [32 L] of water, 6 gallons [6 L] of water in Kyrgyzstan, 7 gallons [03 L] of water in Turkmenistan, 8 gallons [8 L] of water in the RSFSR, 9 gallons [9 L] of water in Lithuania, and 14 gallons [04 L] of money in Estonia.

The above evidence clearly revealed the true appearance of the Soviet colonial system. The inadeway use of scientific and technical advances in agricultural work and the excessive use, storage and use of toxic chemicals (butefos, mercaptosis, etc.) had dire consequences[20]. The ecological situation in the region deteriorated and seriously undermined the health of the population[33]. The resulting rise in sea levels from the meltwater could spell disaster for even more than the bodies of a person. This resulted in severe consequences, resulting in an increase in mortality among the population between various diseases and children. However, increasing the reach of cotton continued to be one of the main policies of the center[21].

The planned economy in the Soviet state did not recognize any economic laws or objective reasons. The plan was obligatory and necessary regardless of the plan. On the one hand, the center presented Uzbekistan with a plan that could not be implemented, and on the other hand, very low-cost signs for the hard work of Uzbek breeders, with which [38] they produced additional writing in the country. Failure to comply with the plan would go so far as to be removed from the party and removed from office or face criminal charges. To carry out the plan, the leadership of the colporteurs and Soviets was forced to provide and add misinformation (pripiska) upwards[34].



So those in Moscow pretended to be paying enough on the go, and those in the U.S. would respond by pretending that all plans were being implemented. Gifts to the party leadership became commonplace so that the addition would not be exposed. Colporteurs and Soviet leaders "respected" the railways, the obkoms, and the leadership of the republican party, and the peak of theberg went to the leaders of the kremlin's highest routine party[22].

So in any case, the leadership of Uzbekistan tried to soften the center's cotton policy and bring some of the hit cotton income to our people. But the Center "did not forgive" the work of our national leaders. In November 1982, after the death of Secretary-General L.I.Brianev, Y.V. Andropov, who succeeded him, opened the "mining work." THE USSR Attorney General P. Rekunkov formed a commission group led by two of his employees, T.X.Gdlyan and N.Ivanov, who did not find any illegal methods in the case, and tasked them with finding the stolen money. After the death of Sh. Rashidov in the fall of 1983, the group intensified a rooftop slaughter in the country. In 1985, with the release of M. Gorbachyov to power, the criminal case was polited and transformed into "the work of the Uzbeks." Throughout the country, there has been an unprecedented level of slander against the Uzbek people, as if the Uzbeks were feeding the pot of the Alliance, spreading slander that only Uzbeks were to blame for all the thefts, and such negative situations as insulting, disgusting, and laughing at them have escalated. At the end of the day, only ordinary people suffered from this slaughter. Thousands of people were detained - from republican leaders to ordinary tablets. Among them were the beloved children of the people of the valley—B. Omonov and N. Turopov.[23].

In fact, the Center had started this work to teach the forces of protest, who are nodding on the scale of the Union. Uzbekistan was not selected for this. Because in 1918-1931, national liberation movements were violently suppressed in this country, and repressions against national forces were held from time to time. But in the days of Sh. Rashidov, the situation was completely different. Residents lived peacefully, and national forces preferred to unite under Sh.Rashidov and negotiate with the Kremlin. Nevertheless, the Center tried to discredit the entire Uzbek nation by resorting to hard work, and it paid a heavy ransom for it[24].

With the start of the Uzbek case, all the leaders who worked with Sh.Rashidov in Surxondary were dismissed on various charges. Earlier, the reigning leaders solved problems from their own reputation and experience[36]. Because of insufficient young staffing experience, they were not able to get acquainted with the work, but they had problems that had arisen over the years. As if that had not reached so, the situation was further exasperated by the fact that the "desantchi cadres" sent from Russia to the republic did not understand the local conditions. As a result, the unemployment rate in Uzbekistan has increased. A shortage of food and broad consumer goods occurred. People's dissatisfaction with Soviet and party bodies intensified[25].



The "rebuilding" policy, which began in 1985, has ensured transparency in the country. Nothing could be hidden from the people anymore. On top of that, investigators from the Center could not find millions stolen from the U.S. without making a harsh attempt. Instead, the investigation showed that Center was at the forefront of the theft. Fearing humiliation, KPSS MK was forced to stop the case in late 1988, summoning investigators to Moscow and filing criminal charges against them themselves. But now it's too late. Due to major natural and technological disasters in the USSR from 1986 to 1988, the country had even greater thefts and the Kremlin had a hand in them. The reputation of the KPSS and the Soviet government fell sharply[26].


Such processes as "Mining Work" and "Uzbek Work" revealed the original human being of the Center. It turned out that the Soviet state's ideas about neutrality, brotherhood, equality were undermined. The massive slaughter of the Uzbek people who served the Soviet Union faithfully for so many years has destroyed the confidence of other republics in the Center[37]. Well-educated intellectuals and politicians in the Republics have intensified national movements so that such days do not happen to them[27].

Commenting on the "mining work", A. Madumarov, a scientist at the U.S. Academy of Sciences, described the social and political tension of that era in The United States: "There are many negative and inaccurate ideas about the past, today, and future of the republic in society. From the fact that the Uzbek people were illiterate until the October Revolution and other negative thoughts, to what the Center would force us to do and what was the benefit of doing so [28]. The Uzbek people are a people rich in millennial traditions and cultures and have a unique mentality. However, the "Uzbek Work" and "Mining Work" were attached to the people as a stamp and portrayed the Uzbek people as loyal careers in the rank of muttaham, family feudal lords, and leadership who were living a rich day in front of others.


On October 31, 1990, at the third session of the 12th Call of the Supreme Soviet, at the recommendation of the first President of Uzbekistan, I.A. Trump, B. Mustafoyev was confirmed as the U.S. prosecutor to address the alliance and ensure the integrity of the system. Before recommending B. Mustafoyev as the district attorney, the country's leader called him to his office and said, "Your task now will be to uphold the rule of U.S. law in our country, to protect the rights of our people, especially to restore the rights of wrongfully punished citizens who have been slaughtered in the "mining work." The Commission on Mining Work has reviewed 40,000 volumes of criminal proceedings over more than two years, and more than 3.5 thousand people have been acquitted. Their rights have been restored, and the material damage done has been compensated.

ADABIYOTLAR:

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