THE ANALISYS OF THE THEORIES OF WITTGENSTEIN ABOUT "LANGUAGE GAME"

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ABSTRACT
This article focuses on "language games" - a key concept in the philosophy of the late Wittgenstein. The work is conceived as a kind of introduction to his concept of games, which is still poorly studied in our country, creatively not mastered. In the past, the author has already presented to the readers the functional-game model of the language developed by Wittgenstein - in the form of its theoretical reconstruction.

Keywords: semantic "field", creative workshop, methods of philosophical clarifications, philosophical creativity, logical pictures

INTRODUCTION
Over time, it became clear that the semantic "field" of this philosophy in action is still strongly deformed in such a presentation. The more clearly you recreate it in the form of teaching (by identifying and bringing into the system the main theses), the more the essence of what the author was struggling with, what the author achieved, is lost [2].
It becomes clear: you need to try to somehow convey what was most important for him - a creative workshop of conceptual clarifications. Strictly speaking, this is an impossible task: to tell about what, according to Wittgenstein's own conviction, can only be done and demonstrated - by showing, but telling (formalizing into a theory) is not amenable to [3]. Indeed, his "late" works are deliberately a theoretical. They are full of endless questions for which you do not get formulated answers, are replete with examples of conceptual traps and many sophisticated techniques for breaking deadlocks. And it is these procedural developments that constitute the main value. To understand, to master them, only independent (from the first person) study - from this angle - of the texts of the late Wittgenstein allows. To do it for someone and to transfer this kind of knowledge to him by retelling does not work [4].
How, then, to acquaint the reader with the philosophical technique of Wittgenstein, to introduce him into a special world of his philosophical work? There is practically only one way out: to reflect in the presentation, as far as possible, the "texture" of his thoughts, examples of conceptual failures, and methods of philosophical clarifications [5]. It is clear that such a presentation may seem boring and detailed to someone. But the fact is that Wittgenstein is generally a philosopher of careful, detailed analysis. In his philosophical research, he avoids "commonplaces", believing that they give little and are noticeably confusing. What interests this original thinker without attention to

detail, nuances simply cannot be grasped. Texts with attempts to recreate his techniques, procedures are addressed to specialists who are able to extract some sense from them, and to those who, for one reason or another, are seriously interested in the essence of the matter. In a more popular presentation, the meaning of what Wittgenstein worked all his life eludes [3].

But when characterizing one or another of his ideas (or concepts) as a whole, you still have to recreate the philosopher's thoughts more or less coherently. Thus, they are involuntarily translated - in our case, this is the principle of language games - from a methodological mode to a theoretical one. Hence the too perceptible presence of the one who "constructs" the author's thoughts in the semblance of a theory and the undesirable effect of perception and assimilation of his concept precisely in this way, which is not peculiar to it. This is a situation that the reader cannot but warn about.

How did the idea of linguistic (conceptual) games come about and what is its essence? It is known that Ludwig Wittgenstein brought to philosophy an interest in the complex of problems of symbolic logic, the foundations of mathematics and the logical analysis of language. Successes in this area (thoughts of G. Frege, B. Russell, etc.) inspired him to search for an extremely clear logical model of knowledge-language, a general sentence matrix, in which the essence of any statement would be revealed [2], and, therefore, - so the author thought - and mental comprehension of facts, this basis of the foundations of true knowledge about the world. Developed by Wittgenstein in 1912-1914 the concept was based on three principles: interpretation of subject terms of the language as names of objects; elementary statements - as logical pictures of the simplest situations (or, in other words, configurations of objects) and, finally, complex statements (logical combinations of elementary sentences) - as pictures of the corresponding complex situations - facts. As a result, the totality of true statements was thought of as a picture of the world. A carefully thought out logical model "language - logic - reality" was presented in the "Logical-Philosophical Treatise", which was published in 1921.

The ideas of the treatise made a strong impression and caused a great resonance in the minds and works of researchers in the field of philosophy of language and the logic of science [3]. Perhaps the greatest was his stimulating influence on the members of the Vienna Circle - R. Carnap, F. Weismann, and others, and on the entire program of logical positivism set forth in the Manifesto "Scientific Worldview" (1929). The author of the Treatise himself by the end of the 1920s. began to rethink his concept. A number of circumstances helped him to understand that the ideal model of the LFT language, honed to logical perfection, is not just far from the practice of speech understanding, but does not grasp, even schematically, its fundamental mechanisms. It is for this reason that the philosopher leaves his former positions and chooses a completely different, in some sense even opposite to the first, research path.

To return to the "sinful earth", to take a closer look and understand how language actually works, what are the real functions of sentences and other linguistic forms not in theory, but in practical thinking and behavior of people - this was in the most general outline his new attitude. He now seeks to consider a wide range of philosophical problems from a special angle - through the prism of language in its action, work. One might get the impression that with such a functional-active approach to language, the philosopher's interest in logic has faded. Meanwhile, Wittgenstein explained from time to time that it was logic that still remained the main subject of his attention. True, the research emphasis and the angle of view are changing dramatically: the interest in the logical syntax and semantics of the language, which constituted the dominant of the Treatise, faded somewhat, logical (or even just speech) pragmatics, the logical behavior of concepts came to the fore.

Overcoming the previous, previously seemed to him impeccable, positions [3], Wittgenstein comes to the conclusion: comprehending the essence of statements, meanings of words - and last but not least the most important philosophical positions, concepts - requires not the art of penetrating their hidden logical structure, the meaning contained in them , but suggests something completely different. What is really necessary - this is now his conviction - is the ability to navigate in action, the functions of language, its practical use in the "fabric" of life itself, behavior, - that is, where the work of words and phrases is completely open to the eye. With such a realistic (also called pragmatic), earthly view of things, the basic structural formations of the language presented to Wittgenstein some of its former limiting elements in the form of elementary sentences correlated with the simplest (also extreme) situations and supposedly constituting a kind of "substance" of the language.

In reasoning, narration, reading, writing and other forms of speech understanding, "families" of more or less related to each other [5], mobile and living functional systems and practices were highlighted. Wittgenstein called them language games. The idea of language games took a very important place in his new concept, becoming not just one of the concepts that fix certain realities, but a constantly working principle of understanding all the new practices of people, coupled with their speech, communicative equipment. Guesses that it is important to take into account the "dynamics" of the language, its work, functions, use were voiced even in the "Logical-Philosophical Treatise": "The question:" Why do we actually use this word, this sentence? "- always leads to valuable insights in philosophy ". And this is not the only remark in this spirit. In the Treatise, as a whole, constructed by the method of a priori theoretical reasoning, a sketch was sketched in several strokes, as if guessing the possibility of the development of another concept that had not yet taken shape, those ideas that came to the fore in the second period of the philosopher's work [3], when the subject of close study was the action of the language. And it was the new emphasis that led to positions that were significantly different from the original ones. They are

presented in "Philosophical Investigations" [5] and other works of the "late" Wittgenstein. What prompted him to radically change his point of view? It is possible that the first impulses to rethink the concept were given to Wittgenstein by his teaching experience, teaching children to read, counting, writing, compiling a dictionary for them, etc. [4].

It is no coincidence that in the works of the philosopher, the connection between the concepts of meaning and learning will then be constantly traced. Reflecting on the "secret" of speech meanings, Wittgenstein came to the conclusion: it is always worth thinking about the circumstances under which we learned to use this or that word, expression, how children are taught phrases and how they learn them in practice. The philosophical reinforcement of the pedagogical experience found in pragmatism was apparently also important. Thus, in the preface to Philosophical Investigations, Wittgenstein noted that criticism of the Treatise by his friends in Cambridge, Frank Ramsey and Pietro Sraffa, played an important role in the formation of his new concept [5]. The specific content of this criticism is unknown, but its general direction can be judged by the comparison of Wittgenstein's new thoughts with a number of points in the works of his opponents [4].

So F. Ramsay, apparently, conveyed to the philosopher the general mood of the pragmatism of C.S. Pearce, the influence of which he himself experienced. It is known, in particular, that Ramsey considered it important to take into account not only the objective aspect of the logical-linguistic picture of the world (facts, objects, etc.), but also the activity of the subject. Having highly appreciated Wittgenstein's logic, he, however, saw a gap in it: inattention to pragmatics, to the connection between the meaning of a sentence and the actions that follow from it. The commitment of the author of the "Logical-Philosophical Treatise" to the theoretical rigor of the critic is maximalist. In particular, the desire for an exact logical expression of what is vague, defies precise definitions, seemed to him excessive, unrealistic. Regarding such an attitude as scholastic, Ramsay saw in it a serious danger to philosophy. Perhaps such moods were inspired by the thoughts of W. James, who explained that the theoretical approach to any subject is based on oversimplifications and therefore is fraught with dogmatism, which is most noticeable in the field of philosophy and religion. Arguments of this kind undoubtedly impressed Wittgenstein. The motives of pragmatism and criticism of Platonism, "theorism" organically entered the thinking of the philosopher, by the way, who knew and appreciated the work of James [4].

Wittgenstein worked through the anti-Platonic idea of the "language game", which to a certain extent revived the ideas and practice of the sophists, until the end of his days, finding new and new applications for it. In the lectures of 1933-1935 [6], having already become, in fact, a new point of view, he introduces the principle of games and actively applies the "playful" approach to language" [5] can be considered a methodology for the development of this topic in the "Brown Book". It is here that Wittgenstein introduces

his well-known examples of communication games, starting with the simplest and going up step by step to more complex ones. persons in the game (1) - a builder and his henchman, the first, using only the names of building elements, shouts out commands: "slab", "cube", etc., which means: "give a slab", "bring a cube", etc. Then in the game (2) a new type of instrument is introduced into communication - numerals. Further (3) such a means of communication as proper names is added (this block! That plate!). At the next step (4), the game acquires words and gestures indicating the place, later (5) questions and answers (how many blocks? - Ten) are included in it. Already first five examples we asked Wittgenstein to outline the idea in general terms. He explained: we will call communication systems (1-5) language games. At the same time, it is indicated that their real analogue can be simple languages of primitive tribes or methods of teaching children their native language (see: BBB, p. 80) [5]. On the basis of the original simple ones, more and more complex forms of speech practice are recreated. Game (6) already includes variants of the question about the name of the object (or color, number, direction, etc.): what is it?

In the game (7), there are tablets that correlate signs with pictures of objects. In the future, new ones are added to these practices, the games become more complicated. In total, their number was brought here to 73, and the idea and method of games were presented in action. A living, working language is unusually complex and includes, as it were, a multitude of interconnected "games". Revealing their types in natural language (or inventing their artificial analogs), Wittgenstein, as it were, "scans" speech practice, analytically delimits its components, aspects, levels. First of all, he singles out the elementary functions of the language and varies their combinations. It is assumed that the original speech models are abstracted from the natural language due to its simplification, the return of words, phrases to the real life ground where they acquired their initial meanings. New, more complex games are gradually being built over the simplest ones. This is how the "ladder" of language complications is recreated, the growth of its capabilities is modeled.

So Language games is a kind of analytical method (a set of techniques) for clarifying a language, highlighting its functions, work [5]. It is conceived as a search for ways out of all sorts of conceptual dead ends that abound in philosophical tradition. It was for this that Wittgenstein invented his own principle of games and developed a rich practice of its application. The method of considering at first the simplest and then complicated forms of communication is actively used and developed further in "Philosophical Research", where the idea and methods of game clarification are presented, perhaps, in the most complete and multidimensional manner [5].

As for the subject of clarification, this is primarily a wide range of intricate philosophical problems of consciousness. These are questions of the relationship between language and thinking, intuitive and discursive, external human action and the internal plane of consciousness, personal (individual-subjective) and intersubjective in pre-verbal and

verbal human experience. On the pages of the main of his later works, the philosopher intensely reflects on the phenomena of meaning (meaning) of linguistic expressions, invariant and variable, static and procedural, expressible and inexpressible in language, about the nature of understanding, about the human "I" and "alien minds" (consciousnesses other people as opposed to my own) and others [5].

The book Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics [5] is full of considerations about the essence of the idea we are interested in and excellent illustrations. Also noteworthy are the thoughts on language games in Wittgenstein's latest work, On Certainty, including the interpretation of games as life forms. But perhaps the most impressive and instructive is the Wittgenstein's experience of virtuoso application of the game technique in the analysis of conceptual confusion. A completely special place in this experience is occupied by playful clarifications of philosophical (and near-philosophical) formulas and words, in which many semantic shades are hidden and there is a constant danger of getting lost in reasoning, going down the wrong path [5].

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